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ABSTRACT
The code generation modules inside modern compilers such as
GCC and LLVM, which use a limited number of CPU registers
to store a large number of program variables, may introduce side-
channel leaks even in software equippedwith state-of-the-art coun-
termeasures. We propose a program analysis and transformation
based method to eliminate this side channel. Our method has a
type-based technique for detecting leaks, which leverages Datalog-
based declarative analysis and domain-specific optimizations to
achieve high efficiency and accuracy. It also has a mitigation tech-
nique for the compiler’s backend, more specifically the register
allocation modules, to ensure that potentially leaky intermediate
computation results are always stored in different CPU registers or
spilled to memory with isolation. We have implemented and eval-
uated our method in LLVM for the x86 instruction set architecture.
Our experiments on cryptographic software show that the method
is effective in removing the side channel while being efficient, i.e.,
our mitigated code is more compact and runs faster than code mit-
igated using state-of-the-art techniques.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is an integral part ofmany security protocols,which
in turn are used by numerous applications. However, despite the
strong theoretical guarantee, cryptosystems in practice are vulner-
able to side-channel attacks when non-functional properties such
as timing, power and electromagnetic radiation are exploited to
gain information about sensitive data [22, 25, 27, 41, 44, 53, 54, 63,
69, 77]. For example, if the power consumption of a device run-
ning an encryption algorithm depends on the secret key, statistical
techniques such as differential power analysis (DPA) can be used
to perform attacks reliably [22, 27, 43, 52, 55].
Although there are techniques for mitigating power side chan-
nels [2, 3, 14, 15, 34, 35, 75], they focus exclusively on the Boolean
level, e.g., by targeting circuits in cryptographic hardware or soft-
ware code that has been converted to bit-level representations [42].
This limits the use of such techniques in real compilers; as a result,
none of them was able to fit into modern compilers such as GCC
and LLVM to directly handle the word-level intermediate represen-
tation (IR). In addition, code transformations in compilers may add
new side channels, even if the input program is equipped with
state-of-the-art countermeasures.
Specifically, compilers tend to use a limited number of theCPU’s
registers to store a potentially-large number of intermediate com-
putation results of a program. And, when two masked and hence
de-sensitized values are put into the same register, it is possible for
the masking countermeasure to be removed accidentally. We will
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Figure 1: Overview of our secure compilation method
show, as part of this work, that even provably-secure techniques
such as high-order masking [6, 8, 9] is vulnerable to such leaks. In-
deed, we have found leaks in the compiled code produced by LLVM
for both x86 and MIPS/ARM platforms, regardless of whether the
input program is equipped with high-order masking.
To solve the problem, we propose a secure compilation method
with two main contributions. First, we introduce a type-inference
system to soundly and quickly detect power side-channel leaks. By
soundly, we mean that the system is conservative and guarantees
not to miss real leaks. By quickly, we mean that it relies only on
syntactic information of the program and thus can be orders-of-
magnitude faster than formal verification [35, 75]. Second, we pro-
pose a mitigation technique for the compiler’s backend modules to
ensure that, for each pair of intermediate variables that may cause
side-channel leaks, the two values are always stored in different
registers or memory locations.
Figure 1 shows an overview of our method, which takes a pro-
gram P as input and returns the mitigated code as output. It has
two major steps. First, sound type inference is used to detect leaks
by assigning each variable a distribution type. User only provides
an initial annotation of input variables, i.e., public (e.g., plaintext),
secret (e.g., key), or random (e.g., mask), while the types of other
variables are inferred automatically. Based on the inferred types,
we check for each pair (v1,v2) of variables to see whether the val-
ues may be stored in the same register and cause leaks. If the pair is
found to be leaky, we constrain the compiler’s backend register al-
location modules to ensure thatv1 and v2 are assigned to different
registers or spilled to memory.
Our method differs from existing approaches in several aspects.
First, it specifically targets power side-channel leaks caused by
reuse of CPU registers in compilers, which have been largely over-
looked by prior work. Second, it leverages Datalog, together with
a number of domain-specific optimizations, to achieve high effi-
ciency and accuracy during leak detection, where type inference
rules are designed specifically to capture register reuse related leaks.
Third, mitigation in the backend is systematic and leverages the
existing production-quality modules in LLVM to ensure that the
compiled code is secure by construction.
Unlike existing techniques that require a priori translation of
the input program to a Boolean representation, our method works
directly on the word-level IR and thus fits naturally into modern
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compilers. For each program variable, the amount of leak is quanti-
fied using the well-known Hamming Weight (HW) and Hamming
Distance (HD) leakage models [49, 50]. Correlation between these
models and leaks on real devices has been confirmed in priorworks
(see Section 2). We shall also show, via experiments, that leaks tar-
geted by our method exist even in program equipped with high-
order masking [6, 8, 9].
To detect leaks quickly, we rely on type inference, whichmodels
the input program using a set of Datalog facts and codifies the type
inference algorithm in a set of Datalog rules. Then, an off-the-shelf
Datalog solver is used to deduce new facts. Here, a domain-specific
optimization, for example, is to leverage the compiler’s backend
modules to extract a map from variables to registers and utilize
the map to reduce the computational overhead, e.g., by checking
pairs of some (instead of all) variables for leaks.
Our mitigation in the compiler’s backend is systematic: it en-
sures that all leaks detected by type inference are eliminated. This
is accomplished by constraining register allocation modules and
then propagating the effect to subsequent modules, without hav-
ing to implement any new backend module from scratch. Our mit-
igation is also efficient in that we add a number of optimizations
to ensure that the mitigated code is compact and has low runtime
overhead. While our implementation focuses on x86, the technique
itself is general enough that it may be applied to other instruction
set architectures (ISAs) such as ARM and MIPS as well.
We have evaluated our method on a set of cryptographic soft-
ware benchmarks [8, 14], including implementations of well-known
ciphers such as AES andMAC-Keccak. These benchmark programs
are all protected by masking countermeasures but, still, we de-
tected register reuse related leaks in the LLVM compiled code. The
code produced by our mitigation, also based on LLVM, is always
leak free. In terms of performance, ourmethod significantly outper-
formed competing approaches such as high-order masking in that
our mitigated code not only is more compact and secure, but also
runs significantly faster than code mitigated by high-order mask-
ing techniques [8, 9].
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We show that register reuse introduces side-channel leaks
even in software already protected by masking.
• Wepropose aDatalog based type inference system to soundly
and quickly detect these side-channel leaks.
• We propose a mitigation technique for the compiler’s back-
end modules to systematically remove the leaks.
• We implement the method in LLVM and show its effective-
ness on a set of cryptographic software.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we il-
lustrate the problem and the technical challenges associated with
solving it in Section 2. Then, we review the background including
the threat model and leakage model in Section 3. Next, we present
our method for leak detection in Section 4 and leak mitigation in
Section 5, followed by domain-specific optimizations in Section 6.
We present our experimental results in Section 7, review the re-
lated work in Section 8, and give our conclusions in Section 9.
2 MOTIVATION
We use examples to illustrate why register reuse may lead to side-
channel leaks and the challenges for removing them.
//'txt': PUBLIC, 'key': SECRET and 't' is HW-sensitive
uint32 Xor(uint32 txt, uint32 key) {uint32 t = txt ^ key; return t;}
//random variable 'mask1' splits 'key' to secure shares {mask1,mk}
uint64 SecXor(uint32 txt, uint32 key, uint32 mask1) {
uint32 mk = mask1 ^ key; // mask1^key
uint32 t = txt ^ mk; // txt^(mask1^key)
return (mask1,t);
}
//'mask1' splits 'key' to shares {mask1,mk} a priori
//'mask2' splits the result to shares {mask2,t3} before return
uint64 SecXor2(uint32 txt, uint32 mk, unit32 mask1, unit32 mask2) {
uint32 t1 = txt ^ mk; // txt^(mask1^key)
uint32 t2 = t1 ^ mask2; // (txt^mask1^key)^mask2
unit32 t3 = t2 ^ mask1; // (txt^mask1^key^mask2)^mask1
return {mask2,t3};
}
Name Approach HW-Sensitive HD-Sensitive
Xor No Masking ✓ ✓
SecXor First Order Masking ✗ ✓
SecXor2 Specialized Hardware & Masking ✗ ✓
Figure 2: Implementations of an XOR computation in the
presence of HW and HD power side-channel leaks.
2.1 The HW and HD Leaks
Consider the program Xor() in Figure 2, which takes the public txt
and the secret key as input and returns the exclusive-or of them as
output. Since logical 1 and 0 bits in a CMOS circuit correspond to
different leakage currents, they affect the power consumption of
the device [49]; such leaks were confirmed by prior works [22, 55]
and summarized in the HammingWeight (HW) model. In program
Xor(), variable t has a power side-channel leak because its register
value depends on the secret key.
The leak may be mitigated by masking [2, 37] as shown in pro-
gram SecXor(). The idea is to split a secret to n randomized shares
before using them; unless the attacker has all n shares, it is theoret-
ically impossible to deduce the secret. In first-order masking, the
secret key may be split to {mask1,mk} where mask1 is a random
variable, mk=mask1⊕key is the bit-wise Exclusive-OR of mask1
and key, and thus mask1⊕mk=key. We say that mk is masked and
thus leak free because it is statistically independent of the value of
the key: if mask1 has a uniform random distribution then so is mk.
Therefore, when mk is aggregated over time, as in side-channel
attacks, the result reveals no information of key.
Unfortunately, there can be leaks in SecXor()when the variables
share a register and thus create second-order correlation. For exam-
ple, the x86 assembly code ofmk=mask1⊕key is MOV mask1 %edx;
XOR key %edx, meaning the values stored in %edx are mask1 and
mask1⊕key, respectively. Since bit-flips in the register also affect
the leakage current, they lead to side-channel leaks. This is cap-
tured by theHammingDistance (HD) powermodel [22]:HD(mask1,mask1⊕key)
=HW(mask1 ⊕ (mask1 ⊕ key)) =HW(key), which reveals key. Con-
sider, for example, where key is 0001b and mask1 is 1111b in bi-
nary. If a register stores mask1 (=1111b ) first and updates its value
as mask1⊕key (=1110b ), the transition of the register (bit-flip) is
0001b , which is same as the key value.
In embedded systems, specialized hardware [4, 47, 66] such as
physically unclonable function (PUF) and true randomnumber gen-
erator (TRNG) may produce key and mask1 and map them to the
memory address space; thus, these variables are considered leak
free. Specialized hardware may also directly produce the masked
shares {mask1,mk}without producing the unmasked key in the first
place. This more secure approach is shown in program SecXor2(),
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where masked shares are used to compute the result (txt⊕key),
which is also masked, but by mask2 instead of mask1.
Inside SecXor2(), care has been given to randomize the interme-
diate results by mask2 first, before de-randomize them by mask1.
Thus, the CPU’s registers never hold any unmasked result. How-
ever, there can still be HD leaks, for example, when the same regis-
ter holds the following pairs at consecutive time steps: (mask1,mk),
(mask1,t1), and (mask2,t3).
2.2 Identifying the HD Leaks
To identify these leaks, we need to develop a scalablemethod.While
there are techniques for detecting flaws in various masking imple-
mentations [9, 10, 17, 18, 23, 30, 33, 34, 37, 40, 62, 64, 65, 67], none
of them were scalable enough for use in real compilers, and none
of them targeted the HD leaks caused by register reuse. Our work
bridges the gap.
First, we check if there are sensitive, unmasked values stored in
a CPU’s register. Here, mask means that a value is made statisti-
cally independent of the secret using randomization. We say that
a value is HW-sensitive if, statistically, it still depends on the secret.
For example, in Figure 2, key is HW-sensitive whereasmk=mask1⊕key
has been masked. If there were nk=mask1∨key, it would be called
HW-sensitive because the masking is not perfect.
Second, we check if there is any pair of values (v1,v2) that,
when stored in the same register, may cause an HD leak. That is,
HD(v1,v2) = HW (v1 ⊕ v2) may statistically depend on the secret.
For example, in Figure 2, mk and mask1 form a HD-sensitive pair.
Formal Verification. In general, deciding whether a variable is
HW-sensitive, or a pair of variables is HD-sensitive, is NP-hard,
since it corresponds to model counting [35, 75]. This is illustrated
by Table 1, which shows the truth table of Boolean functions t1, t2
and t3 in terms of secret variable k and random variables m1, m2
and m3. First, there is no HW leak because, regardless of whether
k=0 or 1, there is a 50% chance of t1 and t2 being 1 and a 25% chance
of t3 being 1. This can be confirmed by counting the number of 1’s
in the top and bottom halves of the table.
When two values (t1, t2) are stored in the same register, how-
ever, the bit-flip may depend on the secret. As shown in the col-
umn HD(t1, t2) of the table, when k = 0, the bit is never flipped;
whereas when k = 1, the bit is always flipped. The existence of
HD leak for (t1, t2) can be decided by model counting over the
function ft1⊕t2(k,m1,m2,m3): the number of solutions is 0/8 for
k = 0 but 8/8 for k = 1. In contrast, there is no HD leak for (t2, t3)
because the number of satisfying assignments (solutions) is always
2/8 regardless of whether k = 0 or k = 1.
Type Inference. Since model counting is expensive, e.g., taking
hours or longer even for small programs, it is not suitable for a
compiler. Thus, we develop a fast, sound, and static type inference
system to identify the HD-sensitive pairs in a program. By fast,
we mean that our method relies on syntactic information of the
program or the platform (e.g., mapping from variables to physical
registers). By sound, we mean that our method is conservative: it
may introduce false alarms, and thus may mitigate unnecessarily,
but it never misses real leaks.
Specifically, we assign each variable one of three types: RUD, SID
or UKD (details in Section 3). Briefly, RUD means random uniform
distribution, SID means secret independent distribution, and UKD
Table 1: Truth table showing that (1) there is no HW leak in
t1,t2,t3 but (2) there is anHD leakwhen t1,t2 share a register.
k m1 m2 m3 t1= t2= t3= HD(t1,t2) HD(t2,t3)
m1⊕m2 t1⊕k t2∧m3 =t1⊕t2 =t2⊕t3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
UKD RUD RUD RUD RUD RUD SID UKD SID*
* Our Datalog based type inference rules can infer it as SID instead of UKD
means unknown distribution. Therefore, a variablemay have a leak
only if it is the UKD type.
In Table 1, for example, given t1 ←m1⊕m2, wherem1 andm2
are random (RUD), it is easy to see that t1 is also random (RUD). For
t3 ← t2 ∧m3, where t2,m3 are RUD, however, t3 may not always
be random, but we can still prove that t3 is SID; that is, t3 is statis-
tically independent of k . This type of syntactical inference is fast
because it does not rely on any semantic information, although in
general, it is not as accurate as the model counting based approach.
Nevertheless, such inaccuracy does not affect the soundness of our
mitigation.
Furthermore, we rely on a Datalog based declarative analysis
framework [20, 45, 71, 72, 76] to implement and refine the type in-
ference rules, which can infer HD(t2, t3) as SID instead of UKD. We
also leverage domain-specific optimizations, such as precomputing
certain Datalog facts and using compiler’s backend information, to
reduce cost and improve accuracy.
2.3 Mitigating the HD Leaks
To remove the leaks, we constrain the register allocation algorithm
using our inferred types.We focus on LLVMand x86, but themethod
is applicable to MIPS and ARM as well. To confirm this, we in-
spected the assembly code produced by LLVM for the example
(t1,t2,t3) in Table 1 and found HD leaks on all three architectures.
For x86, in particular, the assembly code is shown in Figure 3a,
which uses %eax to store all intermediate variables and thus has a
leak in HD(t1,t2).
Figure 3b shows our mitigated code, where the HD-sensitive
variables t1 and t2 are stored in different registers. Here, t1 resides
in %eax and memory -20(%rbp) whereas t2 resides in %ecx and
memory -16(%rbp). The stack and a value of %eax are shown in Fig-
ure 3c, both before and after mitigation, when the leak may occur
at lines 8-9. Since the value of k is used only once in the example,
i.e., for computing t2, overwriting its value stored in the original
memory location -16(%rbp) does not affect subsequent execution.
If k were to be used later, our method would have made a copy in
memory and direct uses of k to that memory location.
Register allocation in real compilers is a highly optimized pro-
cess. Thus, care must be given to maintain correctness and per-
formance. For example, the naive approach of assigning all HD-
sensitive variables to different registers does not work because the
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1 // assembly for Table1
2 movl %edi, -4(%rbp)
3 movl %esi, -8(%rbp)
4 movl %edx, -12(%rbp)
5 movl %ecx, -16(%rbp)
6 movl -4(%rbp), %eax
7 xorl -8(%rbp), %eax
8 movl %eax, -20(%rbp)
9 xorl -16(%rbp), %eax
10 movl %eax, -24(%rbp)
11 andl -12(%rbp), %eax
12 movl %eax, -28(%rbp)
13
14 popq %rbp
(a) Before Mitigation
1 // assembly for Table1
2 movl %edi, -4(%rbp)
3 movl %esi, -8(%rbp)
4 movl %edx, -12(%rbp)
5 movl %ecx, -16(%rbp)
6 movl -4(%rbp), %eax
7 xorl -8(%rbp), %eax
8 movl %eax, -20(%rbp)
9 xorl %eax, -16(%rbp)
10 movl -16(%rbp), %ecx
11 andl -12(%rbp), %ecx
12 movl %ecx, -28(%rbp)
13 movl -28(%rbp), %eax
14 popq %rbp
(b) After Mitigation
stack
...
m1
m2
m3
key
m1⊕m2
...
-4(%rbp)
-8(%rbp)
-12(%rbp)
-16(%rbp)
-20(%rbp)
%eax
m1⊕m2
After executing line 8
stack
...
key
m1⊕m2
...
-16(%rbp)
-20(%rbp)
%eax
m1⊕m2⊕key
Before Mitigation
(after executing line 9)
stack
...
m1⊕m2⊕key
m1⊕m2
...
-16(%rbp)
-20(%rbp)
%eax
m1⊕m2
After Mitigation
(after executing line 9)
HD
= k
ey
(le
ak
)
HD
= 0
(c) Diagram for stack and register %eax
Figure 3: The assembly code before and after mitigation.
number of registers is small (x86 has 4 general-purpose registers
while MIPS has 24) while the number of sensitive variables is often
large, meaning many variables must be spilled to memory.
The instruction set architecture also add constraints. In x86, for
example, %eax is related to %ah and %al and thus cannot be as-
signed independently. Furthermore, binary operations such as Xor
may require that the result and one operand must share the same
register ormemory location. Therefore, formk=mask1⊕key, it means
that either mk and mask1 share a register, which causes a leak in
HD(mk, mask1)=HW(key), or mk and key share a register, which
causes a leak in HW(key) itself. Thus, while modifying the back-
end, multiple submodules must be constrained together to ensure
the desired register and memory isolation (see Section 5).
2.4 Leaks in High-order Masking
Here, a question is whether the HD leak can be handled by second-
order masking (which involves two variables). The answer is no,
because even with high-order masking techniques such as Barthe
et al. [8–10], the compiled codemay still have HD leaks introduced
by register reuse. We confirmed this through experiments, where
the code compiled by LLVM for high-order masked programs from
Barthe et al. [8] was found to contain HD leaks.
Figure 4 illustrates this problem on a second-order arithmetic
masking of the multiplication of txt (public) and key (secret) in a
finite field. Here, the symbol ∗ denotes multiplication. While there
are a lot of details, at a high level, the program relies on the same
idea of secret sharing: random variables are used to split the se-
cret key to three shares, before these shares participate in the com-
putation. The result is a masked triplet (res0,res1,res2) such that
(res0⊕res1⊕res2)=key∗txt.
The x86 assembly code in Figure 4 has leaks because the same
register %edx stores both mask0 ⊕ mask1 and mask0 ⊕ mask1 ⊕
1 uint8 SecondOrderMaskingMultiply(uint8 txt, uint8 key) {
2 int mask0, mask1, mask2, mask3, mask4, mask5, mask6; //random
3 int t1 = mask0 ^ mask1 ^ key;
4 int t2 = mask2 ^ mask3 ^ txt;
5 int t3 = (mask4 ^ mask0 * mask3) ^ mask1 * mask2;
6 int t4 = (mask5 ^ mask0 * t2) ^ t1 * mask2;
7 int t5 = (mask6 ^ mask1 * t2) ^ t1 * mask3;
8 res0 = (mask0 * mask2 ^ mask4) ^ mask5;
9 res1 = (mask1 * mask3 ^ t3) ^ mask6;
10 res2 = (t1 * t2 ^ t4) ^ t5;
11 return {res0, res1, res2};
12 }
movzbl -41(%rbp), %edx // mask0 is loaded to %edx
movzbl -43(%rbp), %esi // mask1 is loaded to %esi
xorl %esi, %edx // mask0^mask1 is stored to %edx (%edx1)
movzbl -44(%rbp), %esi // key is loaded to %esi
xorl %esi, %edx // mask0^mask1^key is stored to %edx (%edx2)
movb %dl, %al
movb %al, -50(%rbp)
Figure 4: Second-order masking of multiplication in a finite
field, and the LLVM-generated x86 assembly code of Line 3.
key. Let the two values be denoted %edx1 and %edx2, we have
HD(%edx1,%edx2) = HW(key). Similar leaks exist in the LLVM-generated
assembly code of this program for ARM and MIPS as well, but we
omit them for brevity.
3 PRELIMINARIES
We define the threat model and then review the leakage models
used for quantifying the power side channel.
3.1 The Threat Model
We assume the attacker has access to the software code, but not
the secret data, and the attacker’s goal is to gain information of
the secret data. The attacker may measure the power consumption
of a device that executes the software, at the granularity of each
machine instruction. A set of measurement traces is aggregated to
perform statistical analysis, e.g., as in DPA attacks. In mitigation,
our goal is to eliminate the statistical dependence between secret
data and the (aggregated) measurement data.
Let P be the program under attack and the triplet (x, k, r) be the
input: sets x, k and r consist of public, secret, and random (mask)
variables, respectively. Let x , k1, k2, and r be valuations of these in-
put variables. Then, σt (P ,x, k1, r ) denotes, at time step t , the power
consumption of a device executing P under input x , k1 and r . Sim-
ilarly, σt (P , x,k2, r ) denotes the power consumption of the device
executing P under input x , k2 and r . Between steps t and t + 1, one
instruction in P is executed.
We say P has a leak if there are t , x , k1 and k2 such that the dis-
tribution of σt (P ,x,k1, r ) differs from that of σt (P , x,k2, r ). Let ran-
dom variables in r be uniformly distributed in the domain R, and
let the probability of each r ∈ R be Pr (r ), we expect ∀t ,x, k1,k2 .∑
r ∈R
σt (P , x,k1, r ) Pr (r ) =
∑
r ∈R
σt (P , x,k2, r ) Pr (r ) (1)
For efficiency reasons, in this work, we identify sufficient condi-
tions under which Formula 1 is implied. Toward this end, we focus
on the leaks of individual variables, and pairs of variables, in P in-
stead of the sum σt : if we remove all individual leaks, the leak-free
property over the sum σt (P , x,k, r ) is implied.
3.2 The Leakage Model
In the Hamming Weight (HW) model [49, 50], the leakage associ-
ated with a register value, which corresponds to an intermediate
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variable in the program, depends on the number of 1-bits. Let the
value beD =
∑n−1
i=0 di2
i where d0 is the least significant bit,dn−1 is
the most significant bit, and each bit di , where 0 ≤ i < n, is either
0 or 1. The Hamming Weight of D is HW (D) =
∑n−1
i=0 di .
In the Hamming Distance (HD) model [49, 50], the leakage de-
pends not only on the current register valueD but also a reference
value D′. Let D′ =
∑n−1
i=0 d
′
i2
i . We define the Hamming Distance
between D and D′ as HD(D,D′) =
∑n−1
i=0 di ⊕ d
′
i , which is equal to
HW (D ⊕ D′), the Hamming Weight of the bit-wise XOR of D and
D′. Another interpretation is to regard HW (D) as a special case of
HD(D,D′), where all bits in the reference value D′ are set to 0.
The widely used HW/HD models have been confirmed on var-
ious devices [22, 27, 43, 52, 55]. The correlation between power
variance and number of 1-bits may be explained using the leakage
current of a CMOS transistor, which is the foundation of modern
computing devices. Broadly speaking, a CMOS transistor has two
kinds of leakage currents: static and dynamic. Static leakage cur-
rent exists all the time but the volume depends on whether the
transistor is on or off, i.e., a logical 1. Dynamic leakage current
occurs only when a transistor is switched (0-1 or 1-0 flip). While
static leakage current is captured by the HWmodel, dynamic leak-
age current is captured by the HD model (for details refer to Man-
gard [49].)
3.3 The Data Dependency
We consider two dependency relations: syntactical and statistical.
Syntactical dependency is defined over the program structure: a
function f (k, . . .) syntactically depends on the variable k , denoted
Dsyn(f ,k), if k appears in the expression of f ; that is, k is in the
support of f , denoted k ∈ supp(f ).
Statistical dependency is concerned with scenarios where ran-
dom variables are involved. For example, when f (k, r ) = k ⊕ r , the
probability of f being logical 1 (always 50%) is not dependent on
k . However, when f (k, r ) = k ∨ r , where r is a random uniform
distribution in [0, 1], the probability of f being logical 1 is 100%
when k is 1, but 50% when k is 0. In the latter case, we say that f
is statistically dependent on k , denoted Dsta(f ,k).
The relative strengths of the dependency relations are as fol-
lows: ¬Dsyn(f ,k) =⇒ ¬Dsta(f ,k), i.e., if f is syntactically inde-
pendent of k , it is statistically independent of k . In this work, we
rely on Dsyn to infer Dsta during type inference, since the detec-
tion of HD leaks must be both fast and sound.
4 TYPE-BASED STATIC LEAK DETECTION
Weuse a type system that starts from the input annotation (INPUBLIC ,
INSECRET and INRANDOM ) and computes a distribution type for all
variables. The type indicates whether a variable may statistically
depend on the secret input.
4.1 The Type Hierarchy
The distribution type of variable v , denoted TYPE(v), may be one
of the following kinds:
• RUD, which stands for random uniform distribution, means
v is either a random inputm ∈ INRANDOM or perfectly ran-
domized [18] bym, e.g., v = k ⊕m.
• SID, which stands for secret independent distribution, means
that, while not RUD, v is statistically independent of the se-
cret variable in INSECRET .
• UKD, which stands for unknown distribution, indicates that
we are not able to prove that v is RUD or SID and thus have
to assume that v may have a leak.
The three types form a hierarchy: UKD is the least desired be-
cause it means that a leak may exist. SID is better: although it may
not be RUD, we can still prove that it is statistically independent of
the secret, i.e., no leak. RUD is the most desired because the variable
not only is statistically independent of the secret (same as in SID),
but also can be used like a random input, e.g., to mask other (UKD)
variables. For leak mitigation purposes, it is always sound to treat
an RUD variable as SID, or an SID variable as UKD, although it may
force instructions to be unnecessarily mitigated.
In practice, we want to infer as many SID and RUD variables as
possible. For example, if k ∈ INSECRET ,m ∈ INRANDOM and km =
k ⊕m, then TYPE(k) = UKD and TYPE(km) = RUD. If x ∈ INPUBLIC
and xkm = x ∧ km , then TYPE(xkm ) = SID because, although
x may have any distribution, since km is RUD, xkm is statistically
independent of the secret.
We prefer RUD over SID, when both are applicable to a variable
x1, because if x1 is XOR-ed with a UKD variable x2, we can easily
prove that x = x1 ⊕ x2 is RUD using local inference, as long as x1 is
RUD and x2 is not randomized by the same input variable. However,
if x1 is labeled not as RUD but as SID, local inference rules may not
be powerful enough to prove that x is RUD or even SID; as a result,
we have to treat x as UKD (leak), which is less accurate.
4.2 Datalog based Analysis
In the remainder of this section, we present type inference for in-
dividual variables first, and then for HD-sensitive pairs.
We use Datalog to implement the type inference. Here, program
information is captured by a set of relations called the facts, which
include the annotation of input in INPUBLIC (SID), INSECRET (UKD)
and INRANDOM (RUD). The inference algorithm is codified in a set of
relations called the rules, which are steps for deducing types. For
example, when z = x ⊕m andm is RUD, z is also RUD regardless of
the actual expression that defines x , as long asm < supp(x). This
can be expressed as an inference rule.
After generating both the facts and the rules, we combine them
to form a Datalog program, and solve it using an off-the-shelf Dat-
alog engine. Inside the engine, the rules are applied to the facts to
generate new facts (types); the iterative procedure continues until
the set of facts reaches a fixed point.
Since our type inference is performed on the LLVM IR, there are
only a few instruction types to consider. For ease of presentation,
we assume that a variable v is defined by either a unary operator
or a binary operator (n-ary operator may be handled similarly).
• v ← Uop(v1), where Uop is a unary operator such as the
Boolean (or bit-wise) negation.
• v ← Bop(v1,v2), where Bop is a binary operator such as
Boolean (or bit-wise) ⊕, ∧, ∨ and ∗ (finite-field multiplica-
tion).
For v ← Uop(v1), we have TYPE(v) = TYPE(v1), meaning v and
v1 have the same type. For v ← Bop(v1,v2), the type depends on
(1) if Bop is Xor , (2) if TYPE(v1) and TYPE(v2) are SID or RUD, and
(3) the sets of input variables upon which v1 and v2 depend.
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4.3 Basic Type Inference Rules
Prior to defining the rules for Bop, we define two related functions,
unq and dom, in addition to supp(v), which is the set of input vari-
ables upon which v depends syntactically.
Definition 4.1. unq : V → INRANDOM is a function that re-
turns, for each variable v ∈ V , a subset of mask variables defined as
follows: if v ∈ INRANDOM , unq(v) = {v}; but if v ∈ IN \ INRANDOM ,
unq(v) = { };
• if v ← Uop(v1), unq(v) = unq(v1); and
• ifv ← Bop(v1,v2), unq(v) = (unq(v1) ∪ unq(v2))\(supp(v1)
∩ supp(v2)).
Given the data-flow graph of all instructions involved in comput-
ing v and an input variablem ∈ unq(v), there must exist a unique
path fromm tov in the graph. If there are more paths (or no path),
m would not have appeared in unq(v).
Definition 4.2. dom : V → INRANDOM is a function that re-
turns, for each variable v ∈ V , a subset of mask variables defined as
follows: ifv ∈ INRANDOM , dom(v) = {v}, but ifv ∈ IN \ INRANDOM ,
then dom(v) = { };
• if v ← Uop(v1), dom(v) = dom(v1); and
• ifv ← Bop(v1,v2), where operatorBop = Xor, then dom(v) =
(dom(v1) ∪ dom(v2)) ∩ unq(v); else dom(v) = { }.
Given the data-flow graph of all instructions involved in comput-
ing v and an input variablem ∈ dom(v), there must exist a unique
path fromm tov , along which all binary operators are Xor; if there
are more such paths (or no such path),m would not have appeared
in dom(v).
Following the definitions of supp, unq and dom, it is straight-
forward to arrive at the basic inference rules [9, 57, 75]:
Rule1
dom(v) , ∅
TYPE(v) = RUD
Rule2
supp(v) ∩ INSECRET = ∅ ∧ TYPE(v) , RUD
TYPE(v) = SID
Here, Rule1 says ifv =m⊕ expr, wherem is a random input and
expr is not masked bym, then v has random uniform distribution.
This is due to the property of XOR. Rule2 says if v is syntactically
independent of variables in INSECRET , it has a secret independent
distribution, provided that it is not RUD.
4.4 Inference Rules to Improve Accuracy
With the two basic rules only, any variable not assigned RUD or
SID will be treated as UKD, which is too conservative. For example,
v = (k ⊕ m) ∧ x where k ∈ INSECRET , m ∈ INRANDOM and x ∈
INPUBLIC , is actually SID. This is because k ⊕m is random and the
other component, x , is secret independent. Unfortunately, the two
basic rules cannot infer thatv is SID. The following rules are added
to solve this problem.
Rule3a
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ supp(v1) ∩ supp(v2) = ∅
∧Bop < {Xor, GMul} ∧ TYPE(v1) = RUD ∧ TYPE(v2) = SID
TYPE(v) = SID
Rule3b
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ supp(v1) ∩ supp(v2) = ∅
∧Bop < {Xor, GMul } ∧ TYPE(v1) = SID ∧ TYPE(v2) = RUD
TYPE(v) = SID
These rules mean that, for any Bop = {∧,∨}, if one operand is RUD,
the other operand is SID, and they share no input, then v has a
secret independent distribution (SID).GMul denotesmultiplication
in a finite field. Here, supp(v1) ∩ supp(v2) = ∅ is need; otherwise,
the common input may cause problem. For example, ifv1 ←m⊕k
and v2 ← m ∧ x , then v = (v1 ∧ v2) = (m ∧ ¬k) ∧ x has a leak
because if k = 1, v = 0; but if k = 0, v =m ∧ x .
Rule4
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ supp(v1) ∩ supp(v2) = ∅
∧TYPE(v1) = SID ∧ TYPE(v2) = SID
TYPE(v) = SID
Similarly, Rule4 may elevate a variable v from UKD to SID, e.g., as
in v ← ((k ⊕m) ∧ x1) ∧ (x2) where x1 and x2 are both SID. Again,
the condition supp(v1) ∩ supp(v2) = ∅ in Rule4 is needed because,
otherwise, there may be cases such asv ← ((k ⊕m)∧x1)∧(x2∧m),
which is equivalent to v ← ¬k ∧ (m ∧ x1 ∧ x2) and thus has a leak.
Figure 5 shows the other inference rules used in our system.
Since these rules are self-explanatory, we omit the proofs.
4.5 Detecting HD-sensitive Pairs
Based on the variable types, we compute HD-sensitive pairs. For
each pair (v1,v2), we check if HD(v1,v2) results in a leak when v1
and v2 share a register. There are two scenarios:
• v1 ← expr1;v2 ← expr2 , meaning v1 and v2 are defined in
two instructions.
• v1 ← Bop(v2,v3), where the result v1 and one operand v2
are stored in the same register.
In the two-instruction case, we checkHW (expr1⊕expr2) using Xor-
related inference rules. For example, if v1 ← k ⊕m and v2 ← m,
sincem appears in the supports of both expressions, (k ⊕m) ⊕m
is UKD. Such leak will be denoted SEN_HDD (v1,v2), where D stands
for “Double”.
In the single-instruction case, we check HW (Bop(v2,v3) ⊕ v2)
based on the operator type.When Bop = ∧, we have (v2∧v3)⊕v2 =
v2∧¬v3; when Bop = ∨, we have (v2∨v3)⊕v2 = (¬v2∧v3); when
Bop = ⊕ (Xor), we have (v2 ⊕ v3) ⊕ v2 = v3; and when Bop = ∗
(GMul), the result of (v2 ∗ v3) ⊕ v2 is {v2,v3} if v2 ∗ v3 , 0x01
and is (v2 ⊕ 0x01) otherwise. Since the type inference procedure is
agnostic to the result of (v2 ∗v3), the type of (v2 ∗v3) ⊕v2 depends
on the types of v3 and v2; that is, TYPE(v2) = UKD ∨ TYPE(v3) =
UKD =⇒ TYPE((v2 ∗ v3) ⊕ v2) = UKD. If there is a leak, it will be
denoted SEN_HDS (v1,v2).
The reason why HD leaks are divided to SEN_HDD and SEN_HDS
is because they have to be mitigated differently. When the leak in-
volves two instructions, it may be mitigated by constraining the
register allocation algorithm such that v1 and v2 no longer can
share a register. In contrast, when the leak involves a single in-
struction, it cannot be mitigated in this manner because in x86,
for example, all binary instructions require the result to share the
same register or memory location with one of the operands. Thus,
mitigating the SEN_HDS requires that we rewrite the instruction
itself.
We also define a relation Share(v1,v2), meaning v1 and v2 in-
deedmay share a register, and use it to filter the HD-sensitive pairs,
as shown in the two rules below.
Share(v1, v2) ∧ TYPE(v1 ⊕ v2) = UKD ∧ v1 ← expr1 ∧ v2 ← expr2
SEN_HDD (v1, v2)
Share(v1, v2) ∧ TYPE(v1 ⊕ v2) = UKD ∧ v1 ← Bop(v2, v3)
SEN_HDS (v1, v2)
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Rule5a
v ← Bop(v1, v2)∧
dom(v1) \ supp(v2) = ∅ ∧ TYPE(v1) = RUD∧
dom(v1) = dom(v2) ∧ supp(v1) = supp(v2)
TYPE(v) = SID
Rule5b
v ← Bop(v1, v2)∧
dom(v2) \ supp(v1) = ∅ ∧ TYPE(v2) = RUD∧
dom(v1) = dom(v2) ∧ supp(v1) = supp(v2)
TYPE(v) = SID
Rule6
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ Bop < {Xor, GMul } ∧ (dom(v1) \ supp(v2) , ∅ ∨ dom(v2) \ supp(v1) , ∅) ∧ TYPE(v1) = RUD ∧ TYPE(v2) = RUD
TYPE(v) = SID
Rule7a
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ Bop = GMul ∧ TYPE(v1) = RUD∧
TYPE(v2) = SID ∧ dom(v1) \ supp(v2) , ∅
TYPE(v) = SID
Rule7b
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ Bop = GMul ∧ TYPE(v1) = SID∧
TYPE(v2) = RUD ∧ dom(v2) \ supp(v1) , ∅
TYPE(v) = SID
Rule8
v ← Bop(v1, v2) ∧ Bop = GMul ∧ (dom(v1) \ dom(v2) , ∅ ∨ dom(v2) \ dom(v1) , ∅) ∧ TYPE(v1) = RUD ∧ TYPE(v2) = RUD
TYPE(v) = SID
Figure 5: The remaining inference rules used in our type system (in addition to Rule1−4).
Backend information (Section 6.1) is required to define the rela-
tion; for now, assume ∀v1,v2 : Share(v1,v2) = true.
5 MITIGATION DURING CODE GENERATION
We mitigate leaks by using the two types of HD-sensitive pairs as
constraints during register allocation.
Register Allocation. The classic approach, especially for static
compilation, is based on graph coloring [24, 36], whereas dynamic
compilation may use faster algorithms such as lossy graph color-
ing [28] or linear scan [61]. We apply mitigation on both graph col-
oring and LLVM’s basic register allocation algorithms. For ease of
comprehension, we use graph coloring to illustrate our constraints.
In graph coloring, each variable corresponds to a node and each
edge corresponds to an interference between twovariables, i.e., they
may be in use at the same time and thus cannot occupy the same
register. Assigning variables to k registers is similar to coloring the
graph with k colors. To be efficient, variables may be grouped to
clusters, or virtual registers, before they are assigned to physical
registers (colors). In this case, each virtual register (vreg), as op-
posed to each variable, corresponds to a node in the graph, and
multiple virtual registers may be mapped to one physical register.
5.1 Handling SEN_HDD Pairs
For each SEN_HDD (v1,v2), where v1 and v2 are defined in two in-
structions, we add the following constraints. First, v1 and v2 are
not to be mapped to the same virtual register. Second, virtual reg-
isters vreg1 and vreg2 (for v1 and v2) are not to be mapped to the
same physical register. Toward this end, we constrain the behavior
of two backend modules: Register Coalescer and Register Allocator.
Our constraint on Register Coalescer states thatvreд1 andvreд2,
which correspond tov1 andv2, must never coalesce, although each
of them may still coalesce with other virtual registers. As for Regis-
ter Allocator, our constraint is on the formulation of the graph. For
each HD-sensitive pair, we add a new interference edge to indicate
that vreд1 and vreд2 must be assigned different colors.
During graph coloring, these new edges are treated the same as
all other edges. Therefore, our constraints are added to the register
allocator and its impact is propagated automatically to all subse-
quent modules, regardless of the architecture (x86, MIPS or ARM).
When variables cannot fit in the registers, some will be spilled to
memory, and all reference to themwill be directed to memory. Due
to the constraints we added, there may be more spilled variables,
but spilling is handled transparently by the existing algorithms in
LLVM. This is an advantage of our approach: it identifies a way to
constrain the behavior of existing modules in LLVM, without the
need to rewriting any of them from scratch.
5.2 Handling SEN_HDS Pairs
For each SEN_HDS (v1,v2) pair, where v1 and v2 appear in the same
instruction, we additionally constrain the DAG Combiner module
to rewrite the instruction before constraining the register alloca-
tion modules. To see why, considermk = (m ⊕ k), which compiles
to
MOVL -4(%rbp), %ecx //-4(%rbp)= m (random)
XORL -8(%rbp), %ecx //-8(%rbp)= k (secret)
Here, -4(%rbp) and -8(%rbp) are memory locations form and k , re-
spectively. Although m and mk are RUD (no leak) when stored in
%ecx, the transition fromm tomk , HW (m ⊕mk) = k , has a leak.
To remove the leak, we must rewrite the instruction:
MOVL -4(%rbp), %ecx //-4(%rbp)= m
XORL %ecx, -8(%rbp)//-8(%rbp)= k, and then mk
Whilem still resides in %ecx, both k andmk reside in the memory
-8(%rbp). There is no leak because %ecx only stores m (RUD) and
HW (m ⊕m) = 0. Furthermore, the solution is efficient in that no
additional memory is needed. If k were to be used subsequently,
we would copy k to another memory location and re-directed uses
of k to that location.
Example. Figure 6 shows a real program [74], where s is an array
storing sensitive data while m1-m8 are random masks. The com-
piled code (left) has leaks, whereas the mitigated code (right) is
leak free. The reason why the original code (left) has leaks is be-
cause, prior to Line 8, %eax storesm1 ⊕m5, whereas after Line 8,
%eax stores s[0+ i ∗4] ⊕m1⊕m5; thus, bit-flips in %eax is reflected
in HW (%eax1 ⊕ %eax2) = s[0 + i ∗ 4], which is the sensitive data.
During register allocation, a virtual register vreg1 would corre-
spond tom1⊕m5while vreg2 would correspond to s[0+i∗4]⊕m1⊕
m5. Due to a constraint from this SEN_HDS pair, our method would
prevent vreg1 and vreg2 from coalescing, or sharing a physical reg-
ister. After rewriting, vreg2 shares the same memory location as
s[0+ i ∗4]while vreg1 remains unchanged. Thus,m1⊕m5 is stored
in %al and s[0+i∗4]⊕m1⊕m5 is spilled tomemory, which removes
the leak.
6 DOMAIN-SPECIFIC OPTIMIZATIONS
While the method presented so far has all the functionality, it can
be made faster by domain-specific optimizations.
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1 void remask(uint8_t s[16], uint8_t m1, uint8_t m2, uint8_t m3, uint8_t m4,
uint8_t m5, uint8_t m6, uint8_t m7, uint8_t m8){
2 int i;
3 for(i = 0; i< 4; i++){
4 s[0+i*4] = s[0+i*4] ^ (m1^m5);
5 s[1+i*4] = s[1+i*4] ^ (m2^m6);
6 s[2+i*4] = s[2+i*4] ^ (m3^m7);
7 s[3+i*4] = s[3+i*4] ^ (m4^m8);
8 }
9 }
1 //Before Mitigation
2 movslq -28(%rbp), %rdx
3 movq -16(%rbp), %rcx
4 movzbl (%rcx,%rdx,4), %edi
5 movzbl -17(%rbp), %esi
6 movzbl -21(%rbp), %eax
7 xorl %esi, %eax
8 xorl %edi, %eax
9 movb %al, (%rcx,%rdx,4)
1 //After mitigation
2 movslq -28(%rbp), %rdx
3 movq -16(%rbp), %rcx
4
5 movzbl -17(%rbp), %esi
6 movzbl -21(%rbp), %eax
7 xorl %esi, %eax
8
9 xorb %al, (%rcx,%rdx,4)
Figure 6: Code snippet from the Byte Masked AES [74].
6.1 Leveraging the Backend Information
To detect HD leaks that likely occur, we focus on pairs of vari-
ables that may share a register as opposed to arbitrary pairs of
variables. For example, if the live ranges of two variables overlap,
they will never share a register, and we should not check them for
HD leaks. Such information is readily available in the compiler’s
backend modules, e.g., in graph coloring based register allocation,
variables associated with any interference edge cannot share a reg-
ister.
Thus, we define Share(v1,v2), meaning v1 and v2 may share a
register. After inferring the variable types as RUD, SID, or UKD, we
use Share(v1,v2) to filter the variable pairs subjected to checking
for SEN_HDD and SEN_HDS leaks (see Section 4.5). We will show in
experiments that such backend information allows us to dramati-
cally shrink the number of HD-sensitive pairs.
6.2 Pre-computing Datalog Facts
By default, only input annotation and basic data-flow (def-use) are
encoded as Datalog facts, whereas the rest has to be deduced by
inference rules. However, Datalog is not the most efficient way of
computing sets, such as supp(v), unq(v) and dom(v), or performing
set operations such asm1 ∈ supp(v).
In contrast, it is linear time [57] to compute sets such as supp(v),
unq(v) and dom(v) explicitly. Thus, we choose to precompute them
in advance and encode the results as Datalog facts. In this case, pre-
computation results are used to jump start Datalog based type in-
ference. We will show, through experiments, that the optimization
can lead to faster type inference than the default implementation.
6.3 Efficient Encoding of Datalog Relations
There are different encoding schemes for Datalog. For example, if
IN = {i0, . . . , i3} and supp(v1) = {i1, i2} and supp(v2) = {i0, i1, i3}.
One way is to encode the sets is using a relation Supp : V × IN ,
where V are variables and IN are inputs:
Supp(v1, i1) ∧ Supp(v1, i2) = supp(v1)
Supp(v2, i0) ∧ Supp(v2, i1) ∧ Supp(v2, i3) = supp(v2)
While the size of Supp is |V | |IN |, each set needs up to |IN | predi-
cates, and set operation needs |IN |2 predicates.
Table 2: Statistics of the benchmark programs.
Name Description LoC
Program Variables
INPUBLIC INSECRET INRANDOM Internal
P1 AES Shift Rows [14] 11 0 2 2 22
P2 Messerges Boolean [14] 12 0 2 2 23
P3 Goubin Boolean [14] 12 0 1 2 32
P4 SecMultOpt_wires_1 [65] 25 1 1 3 44
P5 SecMult_wires_1 [65] 25 1 1 3 35
P6 SecMultLinear_wires_1 [65] 32 1 1 3 59
P7 CPRR13-lut_wires_1 [30] 81 1 1 7 169
P8 CPRR13-OptLUT_wires_1 [30] 84 1 1 7 286
P9 CPRR13-1_wires_1 [30] 104 1 1 7 207
P10 KS_transitions_1 [8] 964 1 16 32 2,329
P11 KS_wires [8] 1,130 1 16 32 2,316
P12 keccakf_1turn [8] 1,256 0 25 75 2,314
P13 keccakf_2turn [8] 2,506 0 25 125 4,529
P14 keccakf_3turn [8] 3,764 0 25 175 6,744
P15 keccakf_7turn [8] 8,810 0 25 349 15,636
P16 keccakf_11turn [8] 13,810 0 25 575 24,472
P17 keccakf_15turn [8] 18,858 0 25 775 33,336
P18 keccakf_19turn [8] 23,912 0 25 975 42,196
P19 keccakf_24turn [8] 30,228 0 25 1,225 53,279
P20 AES_wires_1 [30] 34,358 16 16 1,232 63,263
Another way is to encode the sets is using a relation Supp : V ×
2I N , where 2IN is the power-set (set of all subsets of IN ):
Supp(v1,b0110) = supp(v1)
Supp(v2,b1011) = supp(v2)
While the size of Supp is |V | 2 |I N | , each set needs one predicate,
and set operation needs 2 predicates (a bit-wise operation). When
|IN | is small, the second approach is more compact; but as |IN |
increases, the table size of Supp increases exponentially.
Therefore, we propose an encoding, called segmented bitset rep-
resentation (idx,bitset), where idx=i refers to the i-th segment and
bitseti denotes the bits in the i-th segment.
Supp(v1, 1, b01) ∧ Supp(v1, 0, b10) = supp(v1)
Supp(v2, 1, b10) ∧ Supp(v2, 0, b11) = supp(v2)
In practice, when the bitset size is bounded, e.g., to 4, the table
size remains small while the number of predicates increases mod-
erately. This encoding scheme is actually a generalization of the
previous two. When the size of bitset decreases to 1 and the num-
ber of segments increases to |IN |, it degenerates to the first ap-
proach. When the size of bitset increases to |IN | and the number
of segments decrease to 1, it degenerates to the second approach.
7 EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented our method in LLVM 3.6 [46]. It leverages
the µZ [39] Datalog engine in Z3 [31] to infer types, and then con-
strains backend modules using the inferred HD leaks. While the
mitigation part is implemented specifically for x86 in LLVM, this
approach can also be implemented for other platforms.
We conducted experiments on a number of cryptographic soft-
ware benchmarks. Table 2 shows the statistics, including the name,
a short description, the number of lines of code (LoC), and the num-
ber of program variables, which are divided further to input and in-
ternal variables. All benchmarks are from public domain, and all of
them are masked. The programs P1-P3, in particular, are protected
by Boolean masking that previously has been verified [14, 35, 75].
The other programs, from Barthe et al. [8], are masked multiplica-
tion [65], masked S-box [30], masked AES [30] and various masked
MAC-Keccak functions [8].
Our experiments were designed to answer three questions: (1)
Is our Datalog-based type system effective in detecting HD leaks?
(2) Are the domain-specific optimizations effective in reducing the
computational overhead? (3) Does the mitigated code have good
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Table 3: Results of type-based HD leak detection.
Name Detection Time
HD Leaks Detected Details of the Inferred Types
SEN_HDD SEN_HDS RUD SID UKD
P1 0.061s NONE NONE 22 0 4
P2 0.105s NONE NONE 20 0 7
P3 0.099s NONE 2 31 3 1
P4 0.208s NONE 2 31 12 6
P5 0.216s NONE 2 29 10 1
P6 0.276s 4 2 48 15 1
P7 0.213s 10 2 151 25 2
P8 0.147s 12 2 249 42 4
P9 0.266s 6 2 153 61 2
P10 0.550s NONE NONE 2,334 12 31
P11 0.447s 4 16 2,334 0 31
P12 0.619s NONE 7 2,062 300 52
P13 1.102s NONE 5 4,030 600 49
P14 1.998s NONE 5 5,995 900 49
P15 16.999s NONE 25 13,861 2,100 49
P16 24.801s NONE 5 21,723 3,300 49
P17 59.120s NONE 5 29,587 4,500 49
P18 2m1.540s NONE 4 37,449 5,700 47
P19 3m22.415s NONE 5 47,280 7,200 49
P20 16m12.320s 29 33 38,070 26,330 127
performance after compilation, in terms of both the code size and
the execution speed?
In all the experiments, we used a computer with 2.9 GHz CPU
and 8GB RAM, and set the timeout (T/O) to 120 minutes.
7.1 Leak Detection Results
Table 3 shows the results, where Columns 1-2 show the benchmark
name and detection time and Columns 3-4 show the number of HD
leaks detected. The leaks are further divided into SEN_HDD (two-
instruction) and SEN_HDS (single-instruction). Columns 5-7 show
more details of the type inference, including the number of RUD,
SID and UKD variables, respectively. While the time taken to com-
plete type inference is not negligible, e.g., minutes for the larger
programs, it is reasonable because we perform a much deeper pro-
gram analysis than mere compilation. To put it into perspective,
the heavy-weight formal verification approaches often take hours [35,
75].
As for the number of leaks detected, although the benchmark
programs are allmasked, during normal compilation, newHD leaks
were still introduced as a result of register reuse. For example, in
P20, which is a masked AES [8], we detected 33 SEN_HDS leaks af-
ter analyzing more than 60K intermediate variables. Overall, we
detected HD leaks in 17 out of the 20 programs. Furthermore, 6 of
these 17 programs have both SEN_HDD and SEN_HDS leaks, while
the remaining 11 have only SEN_HDS leaks.
Results in columns 5-7 of Table 3 indicate the inferred types
of Program Variables. Despite the large number of variables in a
program, our type inference method did an excellent job in quickly
proving that the vast majority of them are RUD or SID (no leak);
even for the few UKD variables, after the backend information is
used, the number of actual HD leaks detected by our method is
small.
7.2 Effectiveness of Optimizations
To quantify the impact of our optimizations, we measured the per-
formance of our method with and without them. Table 4 shows the
significant differences in analysis time (Columns 2-3) and detected
HD leaks (Columns 4-7). Overall, the optimized version completed
all benchmarks whereas the unoptimized only completed half. For
P12, in particular, the optimized version (Section 6) was 11,631X
faster. In unoptimized version, since the memory requirement in-
creases as the |IN | goes up, P12 ran out of memory and started
using virtual memory, which resulted in the slow-down.
Table 4: Results of quantifying impact of optimizations.
Name
Detection Time Without Backend-Info With Backend-Info
w/o optimization w/ optimization SEN_HDD SEN_HDS SEN_HDD SEN_HDS
P1 0.865s 0.061s 0 18 0 0
P2 0.782s 0.105s 0 9 0 0
P3 0.721s 0.099s 0 15 0 2
P4 1.102s 0.208s 0 32 0 2
P5 1.206s 0.216s 0 32 0 2
P6 1.113s 0.276s 8 40 4 2
P7 5.832s 0.213s 44 144 10 2
P8 4.306s 0.147s 68 323 12 2
P9 5.053s 0.266s 43 160 6 2
P10 10m1.513s 0.550s 12 180 0 0
P11 15m51.969s 0.447s 12 180 4 16
P12 T/O 0.619s 473 1,820 0 7
P13 T/O 1.102s 492 1,884 0 5
P14 T/O 1.998s 492 1,884 0 5
P15 T/O 16.999s 492 1,884 0 25
P16 T/O 24.801s 492 1,884 0 5
P17 T/O 59.120s 492 1,884 0 5
P18 T/O 2m1s 468 1,800 0 4
P19 T/O 3m22s 492 1,884 0 5
P20 T/O 16m13s 620 1,944 29 33
Table 5: Results of our HD leak mitigation.
Name
Code-size Overhead (byte) Runtime Overhead (us) Virtual Register
original mitigated % original mitigated % sensitive non-sensitive
P3 858 855 0.3 - - - 2 4
P4 1,198 1,174 2 0.23 0.20 -13 2 13
P5 1,132 1,108 2.12 0.30 0.37 2.3 2 9
P6 1,346 1,339 0.52 0.30 0.27 -10 5 8
P7 3,277 3,223 1.64 0.29 0.30 3.4 10 27
P8 3,295 3,267 0.85 0.20 0.22 10 11 83
P9 3,725 3,699 0.69 0.7 0.78 11 10 29
P11 44,829 44,735 0.21 5.60 6.00 7.1 18 680
P12 46,805 46,787 0.03 6.20 6.50 4.83 7 726
P13 90,417 90,288 0.14 13.60 13.00 -4.41 5 1,384
P14 134,060 133,931 0.09 23.00 21.00 -8.69 5 2,040
P15 313,454 312,930 0.16 52.00 58.00 11.5 25 4,637
P16 496,087 495,943 0.03 91.00 96.00 5.49 5 7,288
P17 677,594 677,450 0.02 129.00 136.00 5.42 5 9,912
P18 859,150 859,070 0.009 178.00 183.00 2.80 4 12,537
P19 1,086,041 1,085,897 0.047 237.000 250.000 5.48 5 15,816
P20 957,372 957,319 0.005 228.600 248.300 8.75 56 9,035
Leveraging the backend information also drastically reduced the
number of detected leaks. This is because, otherwise, we have to
be conservative and assume any two variables may share a register,
which causes a lot of false leaks in X86 platform. In P12, for exam-
ple, using the backend information resulted in 260X fewer leaks.
7.3 Leak Mitigation Results
We compared the size and execution speed of the LLVM compiled
code, with and without our mitigation. The results are shown in
Table 5, including the number of bytes in the assembly code and
the execution time. Columns 8-9 show more details: the number
of virtual registers marked as sensitive and non-sensitive, respec-
tively.
The results show that ourmitigation has little performance over-
head. First, the code sizes are almost the same. For P8, the miti-
gated code is even smaller because, while switching the storage
from register tomemory during our handling of the SEN_HDS pairs,
subsequent memory stores may be avoided. Second, the execution
speeds are also similar. Overall, themitigated code is 8%-11% slower,
but in some cases, e.g., P4 and P6, the mitigated code is faster be-
cause of our memory related rewriting.
Themain reasonwhy ourmitigation has little performance over-
head is because, as shown in the last two columns of Table 5, com-
pared to the total number of virtual registers, the number of sen-
sitive ones is extremely small. P17 (keccakf_15turn), for example,
has only 5 sensitive virtual registers out of the 9,917 in total. Thus,
ourmitigation only has tomodify a small percentage of the instruc-
tions, which does not lead to significant overhead.
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Table 6: Comparison with order-d masking techniques [8].
Name Code size (byte) Run time (us) HW-leak HD-leak SEN_HDD SEN_HDS
P4 (ours) 1,171 0.20 No No NONE NONE
P4 (d=2) 2,207 0.75 No Yes NONE 2
P4 (d=3) 4,009 0.28 No Yes NONE 2
P4 (d=4) 5,578 0.75 No Yes NONE 2
P4 (d=5) 7,950 1.00 No Yes NONE 2
P5 (ours) 1,108 0.37 No No NONE NONE
P5 (d=2) 2,074 0.70 No Yes NONE 2
P5 (d=3) 3,733 0.60 No Yes NONE 2
P5 (d=4) 5,120 0.75 No Yes NONE 2
P5 (d=5) 7,197 0.67 No Yes NONE 2
P6 (ours) 1,339 0.27 No No NONE NONE
P6 (d=2) 3,404 0.83 No Yes NONE 2
P6 (d=3) 6,089 0.57 No Yes NONE 2
P6 (d=4) 9,640 0.80 No Yes NONE 2
P6 (d=5) 14,092 1.60 No Yes NONE 2
P7 (ours) 3,223 0.30 No No NONE NONE
P7 (d=2) 8,456 1.41 No Yes NONE 2
P7 (d=3) 15,881 3.20 No Yes NONE 2
P7 (d=4) 25,521 4.20 No Yes NONE 2
P7 (d=5) 37,578 7.80 No Yes NONE 2
P8 (ours) 3,267 0.25 No No NONE NONE
P8 (d=2) 8,782 1.30 No Yes NONE 2
P8 (d=3) 16,420 2.00 No Yes NONE 2
P8 (d=4) 26,431 4.00 No Yes NONE 2
P8 (d=5) 38,996 8.00 No Yes NONE 2
P9 (ours) 3,699 0.45 No No NONE NONE
P9 (d=2) 9,258 1.15 No Yes NONE 2
P9 (d=3) 17,565 3.00 No Yes NONE 2
P9 (d=4) 28,189 5.11 No Yes NONE 2
P9 (d=5) 41,383 8.40 No Yes NONE 2
7.4 Comparison to High-Order Masking
On the surface, HD leaks seem to be a type of second-order leaks,
which involves two values. For people familiar with high-order
masking [8], a natural question is whether the HD leaks can bemit-
igated using high-order masking techniques. To answer the ques-
tion, we conducted two experiments. First, we checked if HD leaks
exist in programs equipped with high-order masking. Second, we
compared the size and execution speed of the code protected by
either high-order masking or our mitigation.
Table 6 shows the results on benchmarks P4-P9, which come
from Barthe et al. [8] and thus have versions protected by d-order
masking, where d = 2 to 5. While initially we also expected to see
no HD leaks in these versions, the results surprised us. As shown
in the last two columns, HD leaks were detected in all these high-
order masking protected programs. A closer look shows that these
leaks are all of the SEN_HDS type, meaning they are due to restric-
tion of the x86 ISA: any binary operation has to store the result and
one of the operands in the same place, and by default, that place is
a general-purpose register.
Measured by the compiled code size and speed, our method
(which is already more secure than high-order masking) is more
efficient. In P9, for example, our mitigated code has 3K bytes in
size and runs in 0.45us, whereas the high-order masking protected
code has 9K to 41K bytes (for d = 2 to 5) and runs in 1.15us to
8.40us.
7.5 Threat to Validity
We rely on the HW/HD models [49, 50] and thus our results are
valid only when these models are valid. Although they have been
widely adopted and validated [22, 27, 43, 52, 55], further validation
is always needed, but it is out of the scope of this work. We as-
sume the attacker can only measure the power consumption but
not other information such as data-bus or timing. If such informa-
tion becomes available, our mitigation may no longer be secure.
Since we focus on cryptographic software, which tends to have
simple program structure and language constructs, there has not
been a need to use more sophisticated points-to analysis than what
is provided by LLVM. Our analysis is intra-procedural: for crypto-
graphic benchmarks, we can actually inline all functions to form a
monolithic program before conducting the analysis. Nevertheless,
going forward, these are some of the issues that will be addressed
to broaden the scope of our tool.
8 RELATED WORK
Broadly speaking, existing methods for detecting power side chan-
nels fall into three categories: static analysis, formal verification,
and hybrid approach. Static analysis relies on compile-time infor-
mation to check if masking schemes are implemented correctly [8,
9, 14, 16, 57]. They are faster than formal verification, which of-
ten relies on SAT/SMT solvers or model counting [35]. However,
formal verification is more accurate than static analysis. The hy-
brid approach [75] aims to combine the two types of techniques to
obtain the best of both worlds. However, none of these methods
focused on the leaks caused by register reuse inside a compiler,
which is our main contribution.
Specifically, although our type based method for detecting side-
channel leaks is inspired by several prior works [8, 16, 57, 75], it
is significantly different from theirs. For example, the most recent
method, proposed by Zhang et al. [75], interleaves type inference
with a model-counting procedure, with the goal of detecting HW
leaks caused by errors in masking implementations; however, they
do not detect HD leaks caused by register reuse nor remove these
leaks. Their method does not use Datalog or any of the domain-
specific optimizations we have proposed.
Barthe et al. [8] proposed a relational technique to check the
correctness of masked implementations. Although the technique
covers high-order masking, when applied to a pair of variables, it
has to consider all possible ways in which second-order leaks may
occur, as opposed to the specific type of leak involved in register
reuse. Thus, their mitigation would have been too expensive, in
terms of the code size and the execution speed. Furthermore, as
we have shown in experiments, it does not seem to be effective in
preventing leaks caused by register reuse.
Another difference between ourmethod and existing methods is
our focus on analyzing the word-level representation of a program,
as opposed to a bit-level representation. While turning a program
into a purely Boolean, circuit-like, representation is feasible [3, 15,
35, 75], it does not fit into the standard flow of compilers. As such,
implementing the approach in compilers is not straightforward.
The practical security against side-channel leakages via mask-
ing can be evaluated using the ISW model [42] and subsequent
extensions [6, 29] with transitions. However, they do not consider
leaks that are specific to register use in modern compilers such as
GCC and LLVM. They do not consider constraints imposed by the
instruction set architecture either. Furthermore, they need to dou-
ble the masking order [6] to deal with leaks with transitions, but
still do not eliminate leaks introduced by compilation.
It is known that the security guarantee of software countermea-
sures may become invalid after compilation [11, 38, 51, 58]. In
this context, Barthe et al. [11] showed that the compilation pro-
cess could maintain the constant-time property for timing side-
channel leaks, while our work addresses potential leaks through
power side channels. Marc [38] also investigated potential vulner-
abilities in power side-channel countermeasures during compiler
optimizations, but did not provide a systematic method for mitigat-
ing them.
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Beyond power side channels, there are techniques for analyzing
other types of side channels using logical reasoning [5, 26, 68], ab-
stract interpretation [12, 32], symbolic execution [7, 21, 48, 59, 60]
and dynamic analysis [70]. As for mitigation, there are techniques
that insert masking and other countermeasures either through com-
pilers [1, 13, 56, 73] or through program synthesis tools [19, 34].
However, these techniques focus exclusively on eliminating the
leaks appeared in the input program. None of them paid attention
to the leaks introduced by register reuse during the compilation.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method for mitigating a type of side-channel
leaks caused by register reuse in compilers. The method relies on a
type inference system to detect leaks, and leverages the type infor-
mation to restrict the compiler’s backend to guarantee that register
allocation is secure.We have implemented themethod in LLVM for
x86 and evaluated it on cryptographic software benchmarks. Our
experiments demonstrate that the method is effective in mitigat-
ing leaks and the mitigated program has low performance over-
head. Specifically, it outperforms state-of-the-art high-order mask-
ing techniques in terms of both the code size and the execution
speed.
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